Interview with William E. Knight

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WILLIAM E. KNIGHT

Interviewed by: Bill Jones

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Q: Why don't we begin with this question, I wonder if you could tell me how you came back to the Italian Desk in '61 when President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] entered office? I know you had been in a similar area from '52 to '55.

KNIGHT: Yes, I'd been in exactly the same office earlier. I had started out with five years in Italy just after the war. That was my first assignment when I came into the Service, [U.S. Foreign Service] and after being in the Political Section in Rome for four years, I was brought back as the Italian Desk Officer, as it was then called.

Q: That's '47-'51?

KNIGHT: That's right. Then in '51 or so to '55—early '55—I was the Italian Desk Officer. That was in the time of Ambassador Luce [Clare Boothe Luce] and Bunker. [Ellsworth Bunker]. Then, in the framework of the rotation system of the Foreign Service, I saw myself as a generalist and not a political specialist, and so I asked for an economic assignment and I got one. I went to Iceland for two years as the principal economic officer there, just a one-man shop. And then a bigger economic job in Canberra in Australia, and I was there for three years. And as my reassignment was coming up at the end of the Canberra assignment, I got a letter from Bill Blue [William Blue] who was at that time

Director, or Deputy Director perhaps it was, of the Office of Western European Affairs in State [U.S. Department of State]. It has the Italian Desk under it. He asked whether I'd be interested in going back into Italian affairs and the answer was yes. I was to go back to the next higher rung, as Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian affairs. So, in effect, I got back into Italian affairs because Bill Blue knew of my previous Italian expertise.

Q: I see. Can you describe this point that you make in...elaborate the point you make in your essay concerning the Eisenhower [Dwight D. Eisenhower] OCB [Operations Coordinating Board] and how that worked, and the change which was brought about under President Kennedy?

KNIGHT: Right. I think that is a fairly important factor in the development of the whole debate on the apertura [l'apertura a sinistra]. In effect, the whole issue was how the United States Government affects, or rather tries to affect, the operations of all of the many, different kinds of U.S. representatives overseas. You have the military and the cultural and the economic and so forth. And there is the question, always, of how to try to coordinate the activity of all these people. Eisenhower tried to do this through, you might say, the military approach. You had this large organization, the Operations Coordinating Board, and every Desk, every year, would have to do an Operational Plan. And you'd have to define what were agreed to be the U.S. policies and U.S. objectives. And then every actor on the scene, cultural, military, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], State, etc. would develop lists of the actions they would be trying to take during the next year. They would identify targets and say what they were going to do to reach each target. And under each action there would be specified the principal action office concerned and the supporting offices, all very precise and detailed.

Q: Where would this report go, for example, if you did one?

KNIGHT: Well, it would be cleared through all the offices in State and then our submission would go over to the Operations Coordinating Board. The OCB had an office in a building

not far from Old State, over on Jackson Place, as I recall. And there would be meetings with all the agencies concerned, with some debate and some changes, but usually not very many changes.

In the long run, this became a tremendous pain in the neck because it was just a huge paper exercise. When Kennedy came in, he was convinced that it was all a waste of time, and almost his first official act was to abolish it all.

Q: Do you know offhand whether this was his idea or Rusk's [Dean Rusk] to get rid of this?

KNIGHT: I don't have any direct knowledge, but I think Kennedy had criticized the OCB before he came in. Personally, I'm convinced it was his. It seems to me there are quotes of him saying it was a waste of time. And so, when he came in, almost his first act in the foreign affairs field was to say that the State Department ought to be the principal guardian of established policy and the principal insurer of coordination. He took it even farther. He said that the principal point where influence and expertise came together was at the Assistant Secretary level in the geographic bureaus, and that that should be the principal focal point for policy coordination and initiative. Not for ultimate decisions, but for the initiatives, because these were the people who should know everything about a country and U.S. relations with the country, and about the problems, and make policy suggestions. And they were the ones who should try to see to it that all other agencies of the United States Government worked to the same agreed tune.

And so, when I came back (as a matter of fact) I arrived on inauguration night in that great snowstorm, this was the atmosphere that I came back to. It was a time when the Desks were being urged, in effect, to take charge, to coordinate actively and not just ride along and try to synthesize other peoples' views. No. We were supposed to actively try to keep control of the foreign policy vehicle. So that's the background of this big debate.

Q: Now, that's very important because your efforts in this whole issue as it developed, and obviously as you saw it, flowed from the direct, in a sense, orders of the President...

KNIGHT: That's right.

Q: ...and he wanted you to be doing this. This was your responsibility.

KNIGHT: And then reiterated by Secretary Rusk who made speeches and sent out memos telling us to use our elbows, you know...

Q: Right, right.

KNIGHT: ...if necessary, bureaucratically, in the rest of Washington. We were not to be bowled over by opposition elsewhere. It was our job to be sure that policy was followed.

Q: Okay. I wonder if you could try and recall just how the issue of "the opening to the Left" began to surface, or maybe—. Let me put it another way. When you first returned, was this already an issue? Did you see it coming? Or when did it begin to surface and how did it begin to surface?

KNIGHT: It had been emerging gradually as an issue over the previous years; it wasn't new then. There had been various times when the question of moving relatively farther left had arisen. Farther Left, you might say, than we had been.

Q: Yes, I'm aware of the fact that the issue had been raised in the late fifties, but now with a new administration, was it more realistic to think that this might actually occur, and how did you begin to see it as a significant issue?

KNIGHT: I think it was partly that there was a new administration, but primarily it was because of events in Italy. In Italy it was becoming more and more an issue. The Italians themselves were more and more preoccupied with this as a possible way out of their impasse in which the old center party formula could no longer rule. The question was

where they were going to get their governing majority, and the Apertura was being increasingly discussed as a possibility. That, in effect, presented us with the issue. Then, when the Administration changed and Arthur Schlesinger [Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.] and others became interested in it, that added to the pressure.

Q: Okay. Now from your point of view, the initiative, then, toward "the Opening to the Left" came largely from Schlesinger in the White House. Was there anyone in the State Department who...

KNIGHT: Oh, yes. You see, you're talking about varying time frames here. Arthur Schlesinger came to it a few months after he'd been on board when the debate had already been going on for a considerable time. There's another bureaucratic element here that might be of interest to some who read this tape. There was, in effect, a coalescence of opinion between two different functional sections of the State Department and the CIA which cut across agency lines. In both agencies the operators, in effect, were in agreement among themselves on one position and the intelligence analysts were in general agreement on another.

Q: That's very interesting.

KNIGHT: It is interesting, and one of the reasons it's interesting was that the intelligence analysts back in those days...

Q: This is an operational versus a research kind of split.

KNIGHT: Right. Now, back in those days the feeling was that there ought to be an independent bunch of people looking at policy without any commitment towards it, so they would be intellectually and bureaucratically uncommitted. This was seen as a double-check on policy. And so the intelligence analysts, the whole community of them, were under instructions not to negotiate positions with the operators. They were just to develop their own opinions. It went to the extent that in State they would bring down their analyses

to the desks, and they were supposed to show them to us and they did. But, even if we were able to convince them that such and such a thing was incorrect, their rules then were that they were not to change those drafts. [Laughter] It was really incredible! And so...

Q: Do you think it served a useful purpose, this sort of...

KNIGHT: No, I don't really. State has moved entirely away from it now. Now all research is very much operations oriented. And, in addition, they've been so cut down on budget that they don't have the personnel to do this basic research anymore in almost any area.

Q: It would seem to be almost institutionalized conflict. The way...

KNIGHT: It was. And, to me, one of the fallacies of it was that you still could get the researchers becoming committed to a policy. It just became their policy. [Laughter] They still developed an institutionalize wisdom and an agreement on a policy. It's just that it was not the official policy.

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: They didn't become completely uncommitted merely because they were kept separate. Anyway, so in the Italian context, in the apertura context, you had a group of people in INR [Intelligence and Research] and in the CIA analytical side. They were the two principal groups. But, then, they had a lot of contacts in the academic community outside because they were the channel for contacts of that kind.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: That was in essence the heart of the pro-apertura group. On the operating side, there were the desk officers, and the chain of command above us to some extent, and the CIA operators and the military attach#s who were making their analyses of these matters. And, also, in the public community, since this is a highly political world we are talking

about, you mustn't forget that the Italo-American community which was very influential in U.S.-Italian affairs, was very suspicious and hesitant, essentially against the apertura.

Q: About a change. Suspicious of a change.

KNIGHT: Right. And essentially was against the change. And Meany [George Meany] and the AFL [American Federation of Labor] were against it. Reuther [Walter P. Reuther] was believed to be sort of in favor of it but he was not an active participant in the matter. So most of the weighty political forces were together with the operators and you might say that the operators were reinforced in their position by this fact. And possibly also those above my level, who later on did not intervene actively when they could have, because they had the power and the position to do so, were probably influenced by this political constellation.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: Now, all of those things had been in being before I came back. This was the situation as it existed and before Schlesinger came on board.

Q: In January of '61.

KNIGHT: Right.

Q: Now, when did it become apparent to you that there was something going on, that there was clearly a political effort—with Schlesinger obviously a major participant—to make this change?

KNIGHT: Well, it was, I'd guess, looking back, probably within a couple of months of the new administration coming in. And it would keep coming up because there were all sorts of specific little issues involved in the over-all issue, like how you treat visitors and whom you

see and at what level on the U.S. side, what you say and how you handle press inquiries and all that sort of thing.

Q: Right. What about these, for example, things like leadership grants and...

KNIGHT: Leader grants.

Q: Leader grants, rather. Was there any specific pressure to open those to the PSI [Partita Socialista Italians] this early?

KNIGHT: Oh, yes, now...

Q: We're talking, let's say, about the first few months of the Administration.

KNIGHT: We're talking about January of '62 aren't we?

Q: '61.

KNIGHT: '61, yes. There had been debate on the question of the leader grants before that. All I really remember on that is that in the fall of '61 it was sort of agreed that we would loosen up. And some invitations to selected PSI people were actually offered.

Q: If I may interrupt. You say it was agreed.

KNIGHT: I mean that there was...

Q: How was it agreed? Exactly by whom?

KNIGHT: It was agreed as a matter of policy and as the result of discussion, exchange of views presumably in the form of telegrams and also supporting letters, between the Embassy and the Desk.

Q: I see, between the Embassy and the Desk.

KNIGHT: And then it would be discussed up above, probably at least to the Assistant Secretary level. It would be discussed with USIA [United States Information Agency] because they handled the program. That kind of thing would also have been discussed with the CIA operators. So there was an interagency discussion of it, if my memory is correct. But in any case, my memory is clear that there was an actual, formal decision that the offers would be made. And the people we offered the grants to didn't come over right away. They had their own political situations, and those that were invited didn't come that year. They eventually came the following year.

Q: In '62?

KNIGHT: Yes, as I recall, yes.

Q: I see. I guess that was after Nenni [Pietro Nenni] published the article in Foreign Affairs?

KNIGHT: Well, it was after...

Q: Which was, I think, January of '62.

KNIGHT: Well, then it would have been after. Yes, because I think that the first one came like April or May or something like that.

Q: Of '62?

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: I see. What about Ambassador Harriman's [W. Averell Harriman] trip in March of '61. He told Italian leaders that the United States was receptive to quote, “new ideas.” That was the phrase he used. And yet apparently he did that without any very specific

instructions from either Secretary Rusk or from the President. Did that have any...how did you react to that?

KNIGHT: Now, as to any instructions to Harriman, I'm not sure that he required instructions. [Laughter]

Q: Well, of course, he was in a unique position. That's quite true.

KNIGHT: He was the gray eminence—he was then.

Q: That's right.

KNIGHT: And I don't remember any prior discussion of the line he was to take, before he went overseas. I don't think there was any. I also don't remember any great repercussions of his visit after he went. There was no follow-up to speak of.

Q: Yes. No follow-up, for example, through Schlesinger? Nothing?

KNIGHT: No. Or from Harriman! I don't remember anything coming from him or his office after he came back saying, “This is what I said and this is what I think. And now we should do thus and so.”

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: At the desk level, I don't think there was anything.

Q: He was expressing then only a very general kind of an opinion.

KNIGHT: No. My feeling is more that, although he had the opinion, he wasn't so devoted to it that he wanted to follow through to be sure that something happened as a result of it.

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: I'm saying, I guess, that operationally I don't recall his taking that trip and saying those things to have been important to us.

Q: I see. I see.

KNIGHT: It didn't require action or any follow-up.

Q: I see. He was apparently in Schlesinger's camp. I have to say that in quotes because it's not... The evidence that I've seen doesn't make it 100 per cent sure, but on the other hand there is evidence, for example, that he intervened in the Lister [George T. Lister] case that we talked about briefly before. And that he was...

KNIGHT: George Lister spoke to him...

Q: That's right.

KNIGHT: ...when he was over there. Yes.

Q: And helped to change the rating. Lister's rating. He at least intervened on his behalf. So he was to some degree...

KNIGHT: That I don't know anything about, yes.

Q: And...

KNIGHT: I know he was involved in...

Q: ...sympathetic to Schlesinger's point of view. But after this one trip I haven't found any evidence that he did very much in it again. That he had very much to do with it again.

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: And as far as you know, that's the case?

KNIGHT: As far as I know, that's the case. Yes, yes.

Q: As far as you know.

KNIGHT: Well, I'm trying to think who it was—we discussed this at the [Hoover Foundation/American Enterprise Institute] conclave last year and someone said that he was convinced that the reason Harriman didn't take any more action, and the reason Rusk didn't get into it, and the others at other levels didn't get into it, was that politically they felt it was a no-win situation: taking great risks particularly in view of some of the disasters that had already occurred since the coming of the Kennedys, you know...

Q: Yes.

KNIGHT: And the threat and the power of the right wing. He came in on such a sliver-thin majority, and here they would be taking great political risks for something that the people closest to the scene said was very dangerous. So, why bother? And, particularly since the people closest to the scene were saying that it was going to happen anyway. So quote, “What are we going to win by sticking our necks out when it doesn't really mean that much to us?” I have no idea whether that is a valid thesis, but it is, plausible, at least.

Q: I see. Well, I think that makes a lot of sense. And some of the evidence I've seen suggests that you're right. I was particularly curious about one kind of question. As I was saying earlier, the kinds of nuts and bolts, the nitty gritty daily activities sort of knowledge which very often, I think, scholars fail to look for. I wonder if you could perhaps give me a description of what a day was like for you on the Desk? I mean, precisely what kinds of thing did you do on an average day, if there is such a thing as an average day?

KNIGHT: All right.

Q: From when you came in in the morning to when you left in the evening.

KNIGHT: All right, all right. The telegraph traffic would probably be your first thing in the morning, although it would continue during the day because you'd continue to get batches. But the biggest batch was there in the morning.

Q: The things that had come in during the night, for example, overnight?

KNIGHT: That's right. And the Desk got everything that related to Italy. As far as I know, everything. And so you'd wade through it and this was a task. It would be a couple of inches high. So it would be...

Q: In a single day? A couple of inches high?

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: Wow!

KNIGHT: Including the dispatches and the telegrams both.

Q: From the Embassy.

KNIGHT: And you'd sort them out and the things you had to read quickly you'd read quickly, and some with more care than others. But, nevertheless you had this volume of stuff because it wouldn't just be Italian affairs but it would be NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] because Italy's involved in NATO etc., etc. So, the traffic you would wade through. Then, anybody going out to Italy in an official capacity of any kind, a new appointee or a visiting fireman, would come by the Desk for a briefing, typically. Any telegram going out to the Embassy with instructions or questions or anything, would be cleared with the Desk. This was one of the instruments of coordination and control, this clearance process.

Q: That's especially interesting for me because apparently at one point Schlesinger would be writing letters to people in Italy without clearing them with you. He did, didn't he?

KNIGHT: Oh, yes, yes, yes. And then, continual meetings. Italians coming in from Italy would be seeing others but would be coming through the Desk. In the case of an official visit like the Fanfani [Amintore Fanfani] visit it was a tremendous exercise because the Desk would be the point of coordination for all the preparatory paperwork.

Q: I see. Did you, for example, have anything to do with deciding who would be invited to functions and scheduling appointments and, for example, that kind of thing?

KNIGHT: Not really, because with a presidential or a prime ministerial visit, I don't mean to say that the desk was doing all that. It was not. And these practices tended to vary somewhat from year to year. But the Desk plays a huge role in any of the substantive preparations on policies.

Q: Yes. For example, did you supply the President with any kind of policy papers or suggestions as to what he might discuss with Fanfani or that kind of thing?

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: You did.

KNIGHT: But on Fanfani that was just a single memo.

Q: Typically, I see.

KNIGHT: I mean, as I recall, on this issue it was a single memo. Then there would be different memos on different subjects as well. More than one.

So. For the rest of the day the Desk was the working point of contact with the Italian Embassy. Now, the Italian Embassy was one of the most active and effective embassies

and they had their contacts all over town. They would often know about things in our government before we did. [Laughter] Old Ortona [Egidio Ortona], who later became ambassador here, was an incredible operator, terribly good. He was a good fellow, I'm not criticizing him at all. But they were very active and the Desk was one of their principal points of contact. I'm not saying the Desk was all of it. They would also go in to see the Office Director and the Assistant Secretary and the deputy assistants. And if the issue got big, they'd go up to the under secretaries, and the Secretary. But that was part of the Desk's function and an important part.

What other elements of the thing? Well, analyses. You'd have questions come down about what's going on in Italy or what was the importance to Italy of such and such a thing. And the Desk was supposed to have the expertise to tell people what the political constellation of forces was and what the probable meaning of this or that was and so forth. So there was a continual memorandum-writing function that the Desk performed.

Q: Did you have a staff to help you with this sort of thing?

KNIGHT: Oh, yes!

Q: A research staff? How many people?

KNIGHT: Not a research staff, they were all sort of operational people you might say.

Q: I see. I see.

KNIGHT: At that time, I was the Officer in Charge of Italy and Austria and there was an Austrian Desk Officer and an Italian Desk Officer. And also we had an Economic Officer on the Italian Desk then.

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: And then there were two people in the file room one of whom would also do some background paper work. And then we had the staff of secretaries. So there was a good little set.

One of the basic differences—the changes—in the Foreign Service structure since those days which I think is fundamental and terribly harmful is that the Desks do not typically now have their own economic officers.

Q: When did that change?

KNIGHT: Over the years. Gradually, with the attrition, the budgetary constraints, they'd shift to one economic officer for a regional office, or one and a half or two, which would mean that these economic officers would then have to cover many countries. Well, to me, this means that they don't really know what's going on in any one country. And I think it's very much too bad. But that's a sideline.

Q: A side issue, right.

KNIGHT: A side issue.

Q: Let's say, for example, you were to get a request from either the Assistant Secretary or the Secretary. Let's say on some development in the Italian Parliament. And they were concerned about what it meant and how the United States ought to respond to it. And they were to send you a memo saying what does this mean? How would you respond in terms of the mechanics of what you would do?

KNIGHT: Well, they would either send a memo or their aide would just get on the phone and say send us a memo. Or very often they would just get a telegram and have questions about it and they'd scribble on it, “What does this mean?” And that would come down to us and then, if they were in a great hurry, we might simply go up and tell them orally—but the proper way of doing it would be to write them a memo. “In response to your question, this

is what we think is the situation and what it means to us." And, at that point, if we had an action to suggest, we could suggest a course of action. Very often, this kind of request for a memo was related to a development. Somebody would be coming in. Somebody visiting. They were expected to raise certain things. The Embassy had already told us they were going to raise certain things. Or the Italian Government had raised a problem in Rome and the Embassy had to respond and what was our response going to be, etc., etc.? On most of these endless numbers of action questions, the Desk would be the principal initial formulator of a response. And then the Desk would be responsible for clearing [the reply] with any other U.S. government agencies or sections of the State Department that had a legitimate interest.

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: And then that memo would go back up through channels, depending on how high it was to go. Certainly it would always go through the Office Director, the officer who was in charge of Western European Affairs. And then if it was aimed at the Bureau level, it would just stop at the Bureau. Or, if it were addressed to an under secretary or the Secretary, it would go up through channels to that destination.

Q: I see. So obviously, for example, when Fanfani came, you had a lot of work in connection with that visit.

KNIGHT: Oh, yes.

Q: On the other side of the coin, for example, when President Kennedy visited Italy—oh, you weren't there in June of '63.

KNIGHT: No.

Q: But I assume that that, too, would have, for the Italian Desk Officer, meant a great deal of responsibility.

KNIGHT: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

Q: In terms of the nuts and bolts of a presidential visit.

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: What sort of things, for example, do you think they might ask the Italian Desk Officer if the President was going to visit Rome?

KNIGHT: Well, the most important would be a whole series of briefing papers, depending on the subject. And then the Desk also would clear everybody else's briefing papers. Because the result would be a great big briefing book, you see. And then there are backgrounds on the current situation in Italy and Italian preoccupations and descriptions of the political scene and so forth.

Q: Yes.

KNIGHT: There was always a lot of biographic data included. That, however, was fundamentally the responsibility of INR [Intelligence and Research], the intelligence side.

Q: I see. Well, let's return then for a moment to the gradual emergence of this Opening-to-the- Left issue. How often did you communicate with Ambassador Reinhardt [G. Frederick Reinhardt], with Mr. Horsey [Outerbridge Horsey] and people in the Embassy? And, in general, was it daily, were you in contact in a daily way?

KNIGHT: No, that would be an exaggeration. Continually, and what I would call frequently, but by no means daily. I would say we probably exchanged letters—see, it's considered good practice in that role, between the Embassy and the Desk, to exchange backgrounder letters frequently. By that I mean every week, ten days, every two weeks or something, in which we would just keep each other informed of what was cooking, what the problems were, what was coming up, what was being worked on. It's an element of coordination.

And, I would imagine we exchanged letters every couple of weeks, something like that. Not always on this. Not necessarily on this.

Q: Not necessarily...

KNIGHT: Not necessarily. Very much of this issue was of such importance and sensitivity that it would come in a telegram. You see, the problem about a letter is that it gets no distribution unless the Desk Officer deliberately decides to reproduce it and to send it to somebody else who he knows is interested. And so, there is sort of a tension there. On the one hand, letters are encouraged because they provide a form of coordination which is better than a telegram that is going to be distributed to a hundred and fifty people. They permit more freedom of expression and so forth.

Q: Sure.

KNIGHT: But on the other hand, they are not distributed, so there is suspicion that some things are sent back by letter that really should not be. So, this is a problem that is never going to be resolved. It will always be there. It has to be watched over.

Q: Right. Was the May '61 meeting that you had, you and I think, Mr. Blue, with Mr. Schlesinger at the White House, was that your first overt discussion of this issue with him?

KNIGHT: I really do not remember and I cannot testify as to when the meetings were. I don't think...

Q: Do you remember that particular meeting in May of '61?

KNIGHT: Oh, yes. I remember that one specifically.

Q: What did he say? What did he try and...was he trying to convince you?

KNIGHT: As I recall, it was sort of pro forma. He was...He didn't really try to convince us. He didn't really think there was any chance, I think. [Laughter]

Q: The evidence certainly suggests that he definitely was trying...

KNIGHT: And incidentally Rostow [Walt W. Rostow] was present; he was there too.

Q: Oh, he was! I didn't know that.

KNIGHT: Rostow was there and it was in Schlesinger's office in the East Wing. And Rostow just sort of sat there, owlishly listening, didn't participate. He didn't do much, as I recall. But I think Schlesinger made some of his key points and asked our opinion and we, in effect, replied that we considered it a risky thing for the United States. We had nothing to gain and it [The Apertura] was going to happen anyway. The meeting wasn't terribly long as I recall, probably thirty-five or forty minutes, something like that.

Q: What was the mood of the group? Was it in any way tense or...

KNIGHT: No. That one wasn't tense.

Q: I know that there was a later meeting with Mr. Horsey which was very, very bitter.

KNIGHT: I've heard second hand that that was very bitter and very outspoken, but this one was not that at all. This was sort of unimpassioned. So, I don't remember anything from that meeting that was of particular significance. It didn't lead to anything.

Q: Did you have the sense at that point that he might be moving in this direction, whether or not you were going to go along with him?

KNIGHT: Oh, no. If my memory is correct, he had already given abundant evidence that he was thinking in these terms. But that was not the kick-off...

Q: But when I say moving I mean—I certainly agree with you there was evidence before May '61—When I say moving, though, I mean that he would take direct action on his own.

KNIGHT: No.

Q: No.

KNIGHT: No, I wouldn't say so.

Q: So that was then somewhat of a surprise to you when it did come.

KNIGHT: Right. And incidentally, before I gave my talk last year, I went over to see Bill Blue, who lives in Georgetown, and he couldn't remember anything about that meeting, either. He said it seemed to him a rather perfunctory meeting. It was not a dramatic encounter.

Q: No, but that's not the description Schlesinger gives for it either. But, it was just sort of a frank exchange of views. To say the least. Diplomatically put.

KNIGHT: But I think that Platt [Alan A. Platt] makes the point that it was following that meeting that Schlesinger in effect gave up on the State Department and decided to try to go out on his own.

Q: Did you feel at that point, or at any point soon after, that he had essentially an anti-bureaucratic bias? That he tended to think that innovation could come only by working around the bureaucracy? Which I think is a fair description of his...

KNIGHT: Oh, I think we know it now. I mean, in his book it's quite clear.

Q: A Thousand Days. Is what you're talking about?

KNIGHT: Yeah. Whether we were aware of it as early as May of that year. We already knew, I think, by then that he was very interested because he was meeting with Dana Durand and others and urging us to do things on the individual elements of substance. So, I think we knew what his interests were and what his recommendations were.

Q: Right. Now, by June of '61 when Fanfani came, you did specifically at that point recommend against the President opening this question with him?

KNIGHT: We sent a memo to the President, but I'll have to confess that exactly what we said in that memo I have to get from documents like this that mention it. I certainly remember that we did not recommend any change in our essential position. We did not...I can testify that we did not say that the United States should change its position and come out in favor of openly encouraging the apertura.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: In other words, essentially it would have been a reiteration of our concern and the possible implications [of the apertura} for policy in relations with NATO and the rest of it.

Q: Right. Now, apparently Schlesinger, Komer [Robert W. Komer] and some others urged the President to at least informally raise the issue with Fanfani. To at least suggest that if you think it's a good idea, we would support it. Rather than to imply that the United States would want to push it against the wishes of the Italian Government. But when the meeting was over, the President's own recollection was very, very general and he wasn't even sure he had raised it. The evidence that I've seen suggests that he wasn't even, he didn't even remember with any certainty that he had said anything about it.

KNIGHT: Really!

Q: Yes. He doubted that. He said, "I think I mentioned it." But only—and even then if he did, and that's not sure—it was in only the most general way saying that if you think that you wanted to move in this direction, we would not be against it. Which is certainly something far short of an open and active endorsement.

KNIGHT: Right.

Q: Which would seem to be much, much closer to your position than it was to Schlesinger's.

KNIGHT: Well, the only thing I can contribute to that is that nothing came down to us on the Desk which indicated any change in the President's position on it, or which in effect indicated any presidential position on it at all.

Q: At all, right. And you had to assume, therefore, that the policy was the policy previously in effect.

KNIGHT: That's right. If they were going to have that writ run, it had to come down to the Desk, because that was the place where it ran.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: At least in those days, that was the place where it ran. That was the place where actions were taken on all the individual substantive questions which flowed from the policy posture. And so, it would have had to come to us. And it didn't come to us.

Q: So then, your argument in your essay that there was never, essentially, as Platt would say, two policies running concurrently or parallel. You argued and said that there was one policy, plus dissenters from that policy who tried to change it.

KNIGHT: And who tried to give the impression that there had been a change.

Q: And that the President approved of that change.

KNIGHT: That's correct.

Q: At least tacitly.

KNIGHT: That's correct.

Q: If not actively.

KNIGHT: That's correct. And I say that there was only one policy, and that we were responsible for coordinating its implementation, and that's what we were trying to do. Any policy can be challenged any time, and arguments can be adduced for the need for a change, and then it's debated, and that's fair game.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: But it was never changed during this period, and so anybody who was acting on a different line was following his own private policy and not the U.S. policy. [Laughter]

Q: This is exactly what makes this such an interesting story.

KNIGHT: It is. It is.

Q: Because it tells so much about the way in which individuals, interest groups, factions, bureaucracy, etc., will try and work their will. Especially...this is uniquely an interesting case because you have the President and the Secretary of State largely uninterested, not taking hold of it, not holding the reins on the issue.

KNIGHT: That's right.

Q: Thus giving a lot of freedom of action to a lot of different people.

KNIGHT: That's right.

Q: On a lot of different levels. And that's what is so interesting, seeing all these things in conflict on this question.

KNIGHT: Right. Now, I think that, because of his [Arthur Schlesinger's] physical position on the White House staff, before he was through, the Italians in Italy became convinced that there had been a change in the position.

Q: Oh, that's interesting. That's...

KNIGHT: You see?

Q: I see. When Ambassador Reinhardt visited the President in—I think it was—the spring of '62- -when I think he was still...

KNIGHT: I was still there.

Q: You were still on the Italian Desk, he asked him very explicitly whether or not he had endorsed the change and of course mentioned what was going on. And the President said, "No, I have not and you would be making a mistake to assume that I did."

KNIGHT: I read that. That's fascinating...

Q: Yes, it is. It's an absolutely fascinating...And it would suggest...it also suggests the possibility that the President was moving in two directions at once.

KNIGHT: Well, my own hunch—and this is not a contribution of fact but only my opinion—is that the President probably knew what Schlesinger was doing.

Q: Oh, no doubt about that at all.

KNIGHT: And was willing to let him act.

Q: Right. It reminds me of...

KNIGHT: But that's not the same as saying that he had made the decision that the whole Government should do it.

Q: That's right. There's a whole different assumption there which is that, "All right, I will let Schlesinger act and if he can move things in that direction successfully, fine. On the other hand, if it falls through or creates real problems, that'll be his problem rather than mine. Because I never endorsed it."

KNIGHT: Yes, yes.

Q: I think that perhaps that's what Kennedy was doing. And if he was—if that is the case and the evidence is indirect—then it was a, I think, rather sophisticated and clever way to do it. Although one could also say it was evasive. It depends, I suppose, on your point of view.

KNIGHT: Well, now, when was that NSC [National Security Council] memo?

Q: That was...

KNIGHT: Asking for a reassessment.

Q: The NSC memo. That is...late, well, I think about in the late summer of '62? No, spring of '62. I'm sorry. Spring of '62.

KNIGHT: Spring of '62.

Q: And you were still on the Desk at that time.

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: Right. Spring of '62.

KNIGHT: Well, that was sort of a watershed. I think that's when Schlesinger really gave up on the State Department. There, you might say, the career officer's attitude as to his function played an important role—if I was a typical career officer, and I don't know whether I was or not, but I certainly shared some of their attitudes. If the memo had said, “The President has decided that a change in United States posture is now necessary and the problem is how to implement it and what is to be the desirable and the wise way of moving, involving timing as well as specific steps and so forth” then our tradition was that we would accept the decision and implement it. We would make recommendations so that it was implemented in what we considered a wise fashion, but we would implement it.

Q: Sure.

KNIGHT: The request was not that. The request was for a reassessment and a re-presentation of our opinion on what the United States' position should be and the implications for the United States. And my position was, “As long as they're asking for my opinion, I'm going to give them my opinion and not what I consider to be a negotiated consensus reflecting everybody's view.”

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: And not what I thought they wanted. Well, if they knew what they wanted why did I have to tell them what they wanted? They were asking for my expert opinion as to what the implications for the United States were. And so the reply that I drafted was exactly that, and it was cleared with Bill Tyler, [William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for EUR] and he approved it. And, that was a key point, you see. He could have said, “No, we have to be a little bit...We have to do something else now because Schlesinger feels so strongly about it,” and so forth. Well, he didn't. He supported it. By then I was Acting Deputy Director of

Western European Affairs. I was still doing the Italian-Austrian thing as well, but physically my office was in the Deputy Director's office of Western Europe. And I remember when Bob Komer came over to receive our reply to this NSC memo. And he came marching in and sat down...

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: ...He read it and his face fell. And he said...

Q: Well, he was clearly sympathetic to Schlesinger's position. No doubt about that.

KNIGHT: He, in effect, had brought the whole issue to Schlesinger's urgent attention to begin with. But, Bob said, “Oh, all right, if you guys want to bleed and die over this.” And then he left.

Q: Did you feel then that this situation, which really in many ways is unique because of the constellation of events and levels of authority here, presented you with, relatively speaking, a unique ability not only to just define policy but almost to make it. Do you feel that that was the case?

KNIGHT: Well...

Q: Or is that—am I putting that a little too strongly?

KNIGHT: It's not correct to say that we were in the position of making and defining policy, because anything we did had to be with the endorsement and the acceptance of those above us. For example, on the telegrams which would present the position on key substantive issues as they would come along, those would go up to the higher levels. I couldn't even say which levels each one would reach, but Assistant Secretary, or at least Office Director. Maybe some of them even went up to the Under Secretary or the Secretary. And so, we weren't making policy. We were proposing positions which were

endorsed because no one else had contrary views that they wanted to make a big issue over.

Q: But, this situation did...It gave you a lot of space to maneuver.

KNIGHT: That's right. It gave us a role. That's the big thing, because...

Q: Right. That's what I'm trying to get at.

KNIGHT: Typically, somebody up the line will be intensely interested, concerned and active. And so, although the proposals will go up from the lower levels, they will be put off or changed, or what have you. The unique element of this situation was that that didn't happen. What the Desk was proposing was, in effect, always being done, because nobody else wanted to take over. So in that it was a unique situation in my experience.

Q: Did you get any, as you can recall, any specific reactions from the Embassy in Rome to Schlesinger's visit?

KNIGHT: Oh, yes. Oh, they were in an uproar.

Q: All right. What happened exactly?

KNIGHT: I don't remember details... BEGINNING OF TAPE II. KNIGHT: ...and I think that we got this in the course of the weeks after he left, when what had been going on became more and more clear from the playbacks that the Embassy was getting from the Italians that Schlesinger had seen. And when I say 'they' I certainly mean Outerbridge Horsey. I don't think I have direct evidence from that period of Ambassador Reinhardt's view but I subsequently became convinced that he had these feelings as well, partly from his oral interview with your series.

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: They [the Embassy] felt that this was unauthorized. It was representing an unofficial policy, an unsanctioned policy, in effect, not policy at all.

Q: Which Reinhardt, it seems, confirmed when he spoke to the President, which, I believe, was right after Schlesinger's visit. Either right after or right before. I can't remember for sure. Now, was there anything else...

KNIGHT: You see, there were various things. There was the correspondence as well as the visit. And whether the correspondence was after the visit or before, I have no direct recollection.

Q: I think it was both, as I recall.

KNIGHT: Perhaps both.

Q: And he did use White House stationery. Did you ever see one of these letters?

KNIGHT: I never saw one, no. But I think they've been published. Some of them have been published in Italian publications so that there should be really no doubt as to whether they existed or whether they were on White House stationery.

Q: Oh, there's...It's...

KNIGHT: I think there would be hard evidence of that.

Q: I don't think that's an issue. Right. What about the Humphrey [Hubert H. Humphrey} visit? Any reaction to that?

KNIGHT: I don't remember anything specifically about that.

Q: Or Assistant Secretary of State Gardner [Richard N. Gardner] who was at the UN [United Nations] with Adlai Stevenson [Adlai E. Stevenson]?

KNIGHT: I don't remember anything specifically about that.

Q: He's now Ambassador.

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: Did you talk to Mr. Horsey at all about his meeting with Schlesinger at the White House? Apparently it was much less peaceful than yours.

KNIGHT: I have talked to him since, because we're still friends and I see him every couple of years. But I don't remember talking to him then about it. I think I know that it was a bloody meeting. [Laughter] But I don't know anything specific about it.

Q: Okay. I was especially intrigued by one thing in your essay when you mentioned the advice to publicly oppose the Opening to the Left and then privately worked against it.

KNIGHT: Wait. Wait a minute. No, publicly the position was of neutrality.

Q: Excuse me.

KNIGHT: We had no position on it.

Q: Right. That's right. I'm sorry. To publicly say that the United States essentially would keep hands off and privately try to slow it down.

KNIGHT: Well, express our concern. Now, we're splitting hairs because if we express our concerns and the Italians care about our concerns we are discouraging it. And that we were doing. We were worried about the NATO implications, and so forth.

Q: The reason I raised that issue—I'm glad you corrected my error—is that in the Platt thesis there certainly seems to be evidence that the United States was at least indirectly involved—for example, Luce's, some of Luce's efforts in the fifties—to influence elections.

Was there any, do you know of any evidence that the Government—whether it was the CIA or whatever—tried in any way, for example, to influence the outcome of Italian elections? To keep the PSI or the PCI [Partita Communista Italiana] from...

KNIGHT: Oh, it's now in the public realm. Now, we may have to discuss later whether this particular portion should be classified. But...

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: But having put that on your tape, I'll say that it has now been in the public realm that the United States subsidized Italian elections during much of that period.

I might throw in one footnote. One mistake that Allan Platt makes in his thesis is that the United States before this had always been throwing its weight on the conservative side; by implication he almost says the reactionary side, although I'm not sure he says that.

Q: I think there is a bias in that essay. Yes, I agree with you.

KNIGHT: That was not the case. The policy was that we were in favor of the center party coalition. And during my first time on the Desk, there was a somewhat analogous experience with Mrs. Luce, because they [the Italians] were already then in the same parliamentary impasse which later became much worse. And she was convinced that the only way out of it was to make an apertura a destra [an Opening to the Right].

Q: To the right.

KNIGHT: To the monarchists, you know, bring in the Monarchists. And, in effect, I fought the same holding battle against the right then...

Q: That's fascinating!

KNIGHT: ...that I later fought on the left. [Laughter] And with success. The argument that I used then was that the Monarchists were just too small. And also, you had people on the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party who felt very strongly against them—as strongly against them as the right wing felt against the PSI, in effect. But the big thing was that the Monarchists were not a substantial body. They were democrats. I wouldn't have said keep them out because they're no-good-niks. No, but they were small. They were about six percent of the Parliament and they didn't really have a policy and they didn't have much of a following. And so, there came one day when the news came that the Monarchists had split! And so that issue died. [Laughter] But exactly! They were not a partita sostanziosa [substantial]. [Laughter]

Q: Right.

KNIGHT: So, I just point that out. Our position had not been to support the Right as a bias. It had been towards the Center. And the only reason that we were sort of forced to consider changes with the Center was that the Center was running out of its majority.

Q: It was a question of whether the Center could continue to rule.

KNIGHT: Right, right.

Q: Which of course sounds terribly contemporary, doesn't it? [Laughter] Platt mentions that between middle '62 and late '62 virtually all of the people in the State Department who had supported your position left or...I'm curious about to what degree that was, for example. Why did you...Were you forced out? Did you volunteer?

KNIGHT: Heavens, no, no, no. That is one...

Q: There is an implication there that there was an, almost a forcible change of...

KNIGHT: No. That is so silly! He could have just asked me. He got that opinion from one person that he asked. He told me who he asked. He should have just asked me.

Q: I see. Well, I would like to get it down for the record.

KNIGHT: That fellow thought that in the State Department's context one was penalized for suggesting any change in policy whatsoever and that I would have felt that I would be penalized for recommending any change in our posture, and therefore I didn't. There is nothing in that whatsoever. There would have been no penalty for recommending a change in our position on the apertura in career terms. The reason I left WE [Western European Affairs] then was that I had always wanted to go to one of the major war colleges. And the opportunity came to go to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. And it was just too tempting to pass up, you know, because those are marvelous, marvelous years.

Q: So there was no sinister...

KNIGHT: And I was right. It was a marvelous year! I loved it! So that's why I left WE [Western European Affairs].

Q: Right. What was your reaction, then, to events subsequent to your, within say the next year when essentially the opening did take place?

KNIGHT: Yes. But it really took place about a year and a half after I left. It didn't happen overnight.

Q: Late '63.

KNIGHT: Late '63.

Q: Just afterward, the assassination.

KNIGHT: That's right. It happened sort of the way I had expected. A lot of time went by. There were modifications in positions and people got used to the idea. There was danger of a split in the Christian Democratic Party, and so that had not been a vain fear. Scelba [Mario Scelba] almost left. But the bad things that I feared from it didn't necessarily happen, either.

Q: It didn't make that much of a difference.

KNIGHT: It didn't make that much of a difference.

Q: That's quite clear in retrospect.

KNIGHT: The one thing that really happened in the course of the following ten years was that it killed the PSI.

Q: Yes.

KNIGHT: And that's part of the argument in the Communist Party now, that they are going to kill themselves if they go into the Government, and that this is all a foul plot. As a matter of fact, the PSI people in Italy now, some of them, are taking the position that this was a deliberate Machiavellian Christian Democrat intention, “We'll kill the PSI through the apertura.” I mean, that's their own rationalization for failure. That's not what was going on at the time. But the Communists are now saying that that is the sort of danger for them of coming into the government. Exactly the same: “That we'll be identified with a do-nothing regime and will loose our support.” They have some chapter and verse that they are beginning now to be able to cite in support of that thesis. [Laughter]

Q: When Senator Humphrey went in '61, he was very surprised, for example, that the political officers in the Embassy had never met Nenni. And yet, of course, by June of '63, when Kennedy went, he met personally with him. Which I suppose has to be seen as a kind of turning point.

KNIGHT: Oh, yes. There was an evolution in that.

Q: No question about that.

KNIGHT: No question. And under this whole process of the Schlesinger pressures and so forth there was, there was modification. The modifications were underway to some extent before he came along. But there had been earlier guidelines as to who could see whom and how it would be done, because we didn't want to give the impression that this was just another party that could be dealt with like any other party. We were really worried about what the result would be of their coming into the government circles, and so there had been tight restrictions and these were, over the course of time, lifted.

Q: Right. There are some very interesting accounts of that meeting, as a matter of fact, between Nenni and President Kennedy.

KNIGHT: Really.

Q: Suggesting that William Fraleigh [William N. Fraleigh]—is that how it's pronounced?

KNIGHT: Yes, yes.

Q: Who was a member of the Embassy, describes Nenni as being deeply emotional about it and how he felt that Kennedy had given him something that he had wanted for an awfully long time. A sort of legitimization from him. According to Fraleigh, when he came out of the meeting he was virtually in tears.

KNIGHT: Really.

Q: He was so impressed with the meaning of this meeting for him. Although, of course, subsequently one could argue that it didn't do the PSI very much good.

KNIGHT: Yes.

Q: But they were in the government.

KNIGHT: But that's their own fault and it's the fault of the Italian political system.

Q: The system. Yes. Your point at the end of your essay is very interesting on that whole question of the nature of the system.

KNIGHT: Italian checkers.

Q: [Laughter] Do you have any other points that you would like to add, on. Let's see.

KNIGHT: Let me just look.

Q: Do you have any additional points that you might want to add?

KNIGHT: Well, there is sort of a personal question, you might say, about the interaction between a career officer, such as me, and Schlesinger, as an example of someone who comes in to the operation as the result of a change in administration. We often have the feeling that the past has no real weight for such people. They tend to feel—people that come in—they tend to feel that history starts on the day that they arrive. Whereas we who have lived through the past ten or fifteen years, we carry it with us. We feel its reality. I think this played a part in that position at the moment.

I saw one note in the Kennedy Library materials that I'd like to comment on and that is that Mr. Schlesinger, apparently now closer to the present day (I'm not sure whom it was; it seems to me it was 1971 or so) was in effect saying that his position at that time had not been one of trying to move the United States to actively favor the apertura, but that he was trying to move it to a position of true neutrality, whereas previously we had been actively and vigorously opposing it.

Q: You or the Desk?

KNIGHT: The whole U.S. Government.

Q: The United States official position, the State Department...

KNIGHT: The United States official position and the Embassy and so forth. Well, this just does not wash. I mean, what was going on then in many, many different contexts was trying to move the United States toward the position of actively encouraging it, soliciting it, trying to push it along. Not letting it happen at its own speed but moving it along fast, partly because this was considered a potentially healthy example for other European countries like Germany. How do you bring the Socialists into the alignment in Germany? And France.

Q: You think they had...

KNIGHT: This was called the Grand Design. They had a name for it. The Grand Design.

Q: [Simultaneously] There is certainly evidence... There is certainly evidence that they saw this as a precedent.

KNIGHT: That's right.

Q: There's no question about that.

KNIGHT: And so, they wanted to press forward with it. And the result was a series of proposals for specific actions to encourage it. Not just to be neutral about it. So, I don't think this new myth should be accepted. The facts do not bear it out at all.

Q: Well, do you have any other points? I think I've just about gone through my outline. Just this one last point. I was wondering about whether or not the Austrian side of your responsibilities...To what degree it occupied your time. Whether there were any fairly major issues.

KNIGHT: Very, very much less. There were really no issues that involved me in internal Austrian affairs. They sort of ran themselves and the Desk Officer was very capable and he handled them. I pretty much signed off on what he recommended, the way Bill Tyler signed off on what things I recommended on Italy. The one issue that was important was the Alto Adige in the Tyrol. And there you had the agitations by the Austrian Irredentist groups. Fundamentally, their headquarters was in Innsbruck. And their internal Austrian political positions depended on agitating this issue. The Austrian internal political balance was delicate enough that everybody there had to sort of play with this issue in order to keep their internal political positions. And so, there was a series of disorders in the Trentino, in the Tyrol, with agitations for broader autonomy. There were those who, of course, wanted it returned to Austria. But aside from that lunatic fringe, there was tremendous support in the Tyrol for more concessions on language in the schools and a bigger role in local government. More local autonomy and so forth. And this was continually being argued about and we were being pressured to take a position on one side or the other.

Now, since this was the Desk in charge of Italy and Austria, it was sort of interesting that we had both sides of the argument.

Q: Right. Yes, that is interesting.

KNIGHT: And so, since we did not want to be involved, we were able to say we won't be involved, and to maintain a true neutrality. We didn't want to get caught up in this thing that had nothing for us at all. It would just make one side or the other mad. And, so that was sort of fun. Those two countries are now in different offices and so the situation is not organizationally the same.

Q: I see.

KNIGHT: Austria and Switzerland are together in a way they weren't then. And Italy is in a different office.

Q: Well, one last point. I can't help but be tempted by seeing some—I'm not sure exactly what the right word would be but...The present situation in Italy concerning bringing the Communists into the government suggests—many of the arguments that are being made sound very, very similar to the arguments that were being made in the early sixties about whether to bring in the Socialists. Do you see any similarities? Do you think the situation would work out essentially the same way if the Communists were brought in? Or do you think that it's a fundamentally different kind of problem?

KNIGHT: The fears can be the same. You know, I might be on the other side of the fence now, merely because so much more time has passed. I don't think we are...the world is not the same as it was twenty years ago. The Communist Party is now populated probably 90 percent by people who were five years old or under when the war ended. In other words, they haven't lived through the revolutionary, horrible experiences that the earlier hard core had. Italy is so much stronger. Our ability to influence is so much less. Italy is so much less dependent upon us that I think that if I were in that position, I'd probably now be saying, “They are grown men now. It may be a mistake, but we can't affect it. They have to make their decisions and live with them.”

Well, now, if I were in the Desk role, there would be all sorts of pressures on me that I don't feel now because I'm no longer in the Service. And so I don't know whether I would be able to take that position. Or, if I took it, whether I would be in the job very long. Because that's a big issue. But I'd be inclined to say that Italy has to work out its own fate now....

Q: I was just interested.

KNIGHT: ...and that if it should happen, that the same thing might happen to the Communists that happened to the Socialists—because we have had one test case, after all. Well, that would be nice. If the Communists really lost great strength because of it, that would be an advantage. On the other hand, if they really did become tame little democratic pussy cats and—or at least no longer Russian—I don't think they are really controlled by the Russians—I don't think they are really controlled by the Russians any more but we really feared that they were so solidly with the Russians in the old days, that it presented a major danger to our security position. Well, if they really were to adopt a habitually independent role—like Tito [Josip Broz Tito] has or something—that would be quite a gain. So, I'd be inclined to say that this time around we should really not try to wring our hands and express such great concern about what it would mean to NATO and the West and to us and our bilateral relationships already in effect.

Q: Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger], for example...I was about to say, do you think Kissinger's overreacting?

KNIGHT: Kissinger is playing the old role and I'm sure he believes it sincerely. He may be wrong, and he may be right. But, I think maybe I would not agree now.

Q: Well, that's very interesting in the light of—what is it now, fifteen years. Well, unless you have anything else to add, I think...

KNIGHT: That is all.

Q: Well, thank you very much. This is very, very helpful.

End of interview